INTRODUCTION
The literature on illegal transactions in international trade has expanded rapidly since the publication of the seminal article by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) . The smuggling literature can be categorized as presenting either: 1) deterministic models; or 2) stochastic models.
The model presented in this paper is a joint product stochastic model of smuggling. Joint product smuggling was first considered by Pitt (1981) 
Pitt's model is deterministic and was the first to demonstrate that legal and illegal trade could coexist with the empirically valid phenomena of price disparity. Martin and Panagariya (1984) were the first to formally incorporate uncertainty into a model of joint product smuggling. 1 They introduce uncertainty through the use of a linear probability function, applied externally to the smuggling firm's profit function. Martin and Panagariya were able to reproduce the welfare results of Bhagwati and Hansen, as well as those produced by Pitt, depending on the assumptions imposed.
Another important contribution of their paper was the first explicit examination of the effects enforcement has on smuggling and welfare. This paper extends the literature on smuggling under uncertainty by transforming Pitt's model of smuggling into a stochastic model of smuggling in the tradition of Sandmo (1971) , Batra and Ullah (1974) , and Ratti and Ullah (1976) . Uncertainty is introduced in the smuggling production function via a 1 Other papers employing stochastic models include, Scholer (1989) , Sheikh (1989 ), Thursby (1991 , Fausti (1992) . However, all of these papers fail to provide a link between smuggling under uncertainty with the literature on the economic consequences of the competitive firm operating in a world of uncertainty. 1 random variable, the smuggling success rate. The smuggling success rate is assumed to be dependent on the level of enforcement effort against smuggling.
The stochastic model presented in this paper allows an analysis of how uncertainty affects the smuggling firm's input demand and output supply decisions. Unlike the earlier papers on smuggling under uncertainty, the firm's input demand and output supply decisions and subsequent welfare consequences can be compared to smuggling in a world of certainty. The stochastic modelling techniques applied in the analysis of smuggling for this paper bridges the gap between the smuggling literature and the literature on "the competitive firm under uncertainty".
II. PITT'S MODEL OF SMUGGLING
Pitt's model lends itself to the introduction of uncertainty through his smuggling production function. Pitt's original trade pattern and welfare results will be compared to the results derived in the uncertainty model, to determine the economic effects of uncertainty in the production of a joint product export.
Pitt's basic model represents the small country case with fixed terms of trade. The country produces two traded goods, (X) and (M), an exportable and importable, respectively, with primary factors in perfect competition. (1)
2
The term (S*) is the quantity of good (X) successfully smuggled, (L) is the quantity of good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity of good (X) used as an input into smuggling activity. The function (G) is strictly concave and a twice differentiable linear homogenous function. The function (G) is also assumed to have the following properties:
Assumption (2) states that the marginal product of legal trade used in smuggling is non-negative. Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the smuggling input (S) results in a positive, but less than or equal to, unit increase in actual ex-post smuggling. Assumption (4) prohibits the cost of smuggling from being negative. The difference between ex-ante smuggling (S) and ex-post smuggling, s*, is the real resource cost or the confiscation cost of smuggling or both.
Maximization of smuggler's profits is given by equation (5), 
p f .Gs The term (P f ), is the fixed international terms of trade and (t) is the ad valorem tax rate. First order conditions (6) and (7) state that the marginal cost of an additional unit of tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade, be it legal or illegal trade. An additional unit of legal trade will result in additional legal revenue p f ·(l-t) and additional smuggling revenue p f .CL· Under the assumption of perfect competition, firms will earn zero economic profits because the revenue from all foreign trade is just equal to the domestic cost of exports. Setting equation (5) equal to zero and solving for p S yields an expression for the long-run equilibrium domestic price ratio as a weighted average of all export trade,
Equation (8) Pitt's smuggling production function, eq. l, embodies a technology that requires the use of both legal and illegal goods as inputs to produce a successfully smuggled good as part of a unit of a joint product tradeable.
The smuggling technology requires that a portion of the illegal good (input) will be used up during the transformation process. According to Pitt, during the smuggling process some of the smuggling input is lost to confiscation or some is lost to the real resource cost in excess of legal trade associated with smuggling or both. Therefore, the successfully smuggled good (output) is less than the illegal input. This "using up" of a portion of the illegal input due to an excessive real resource cost is referred to as the Samuelson "melting ice effect", by Bhagwati and Hansen. 
III. SMUGGLING TECHNOLOGY
The purpose of the smuggling technology is to avoid detection so that illegal exports are successfully smuggled out of the country and delivered to the world market as (S*). As in Pitt's model, it is assumed that the smuggling production function embodies a melting ice effect due to a real resource cost associated with the smuggling technology. The smuggling technology requires smugglers to engage in evasion tactics. 3 In contrast to Pitt's model, the smuggling production function used in this paper is assumed not to embody the confiscation cost associated with smuggling. It is also assumed, that if smugglers do not engage in evasion tactics, then the probability of detection is one.
The smuggling technology embodied in the smuggler's production function, however, does not completely insulate the smuggler from detection and confiscation. Thus, the contribution of the smuggling input (S) to successful smuggling (S*) during the transformation process via the smuggling technology is reduced by enforcement effort.
Assume the smuggling production function defined in equation (1) 
G( L,S 1
). Defining the expected value of (u) as E(u)-u, where Ei s the expectations operator; certainty in this situation means to replace (u) with (u). Then by the Jensen Inequality,
and proposition I is established. 5
An economic implication of the introduction of production uncertainty into Pitt's model is that the mere presence of uncertainty, ceteris paribus, increases the real resource cost of smuggling as compared to the case where the firm is operating in a world of certainty.
The introduction of uncertainty into the smuggling production function requires that the smuggling firm's profit function (eq.11) be redefined in terms of utility. It is assumed that the firm's utility function conforms to the characteristics of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and the third derivative of the utility function exists. U n der these assumptions, the firm's utility of profit function is,
with U' (•)>O, and u• 2::. 0, depending upon whether the firm is risk preferring, .L. risk neutral, or a risk averter.
It is assumed that the firm's goal is to maximize expected utility from profit. The first order conditions are,
6 The Jensen Inequality states that if a function is concave the following is true: E[h(X)] < h(E[X)). The implication for the smuggling technology is that the output of successful smuggling s· in an uncertain environment is less than the output of s· if production had taken place with the expected value of the random variable S 1 , i.e., a certain environment. See Rao (1973, p.58) for an explanation of Jensen's inequality.
The second order conditions are,
where it is assumed that,
V. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL TRADE.
(20)
In this section it will be demonstrated that the introduction of uncertainty into the Pitt smuggling production function will generate the following results: 1) under conditions of uncertainty, the risk averse (preferring) firm will engage in less (more) legal and illegal trade than the risk neutral firm; and 2) the risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and illegal trade than it would under conditions of certainty.
The analysis begins by rewriting the FOC, eqs. 18 and 19 in the following manner,
Adopting Horowitz's (1970) alternative way of expressing the FOC, yields 
If equation (30) .c.
o.
According to conditions 33 and 34, the marginal cost of producing the good to be used as legal and illegal inputs in joint product trade, (P 8 ), is less than, equal to, or greater than the expected marginal revenue of the >· tradeable, be it legal or illegal as u• '2 0. This implies that the risk averse firm will engage in less legal and illegal trade than the risk neutral firm, and the risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and illegal trade than the risk preferring firm. This discussion establishes proposition II, given the conditions stated above.
Proposition II leads to the next issue: a comparison of the demand for legal and illegal inputs by the risk neutral firm to the firm operating in a certainty environment. Eq uations 12 and 13 represent the firm's FOC under certainty. Eq uations 26 and 27 represent the firm's FOC under uncertainty. Now, our attention will focus on the marginal product terms found in those two sets of equations. U n der the assumption that the third derivative of the smuggling production function exists, the marginal product terms are defined as functions of La nd S under the FOC for the certainty case as: 6
and for the risk neutral firm operating under uncertainty, Equations 12a, 13a, 26a, and 27a leads to the third proposition, To establish the third proposition, it is assumed that the marginal product functions defined in equations 26a and 27a, are (themselves) concave functions. Concavity implies that the second order total differentials of the marginal product functions are negative semidefinite. The economic consequences of the concavity assumption are: 1) the elasticities of the marginal product curves are non-increasing functions of factor inputs, on/oL � 0, and oi'/oS 1 � 0; 7
and 2) that legal and illegal inputs complement one another less and less as more of each input is employed in the production of a joint-product tradeable,
6 A certainty environment implies that the random variable u is replaced with its expected value, 0. One must also remember in eqs. 12a, 13a, 26a, and 27a, that pS represents the marginal cost of domestic production of the export good. The implication of inequality 37 for eqs. 12a and 26a is that the risk neutral firm will engage in less legal trade than if the firm was operating in a world of certainty. The implication of inequality 38 for eqs. 13a and 27a is that the risk neutral firm will engage in less illegal trade than if the firm was operating in a world of certainty. Thus, proposition III is established.
When smuggling incurs a real resource cost in the Pitt model, Pitt demonstrates that the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous. The introduction of uncertainty modifies Pitt's ambiguous welfare result derived under certainty. First, proposition I established that uncertainty reduces the ability of smugglers to transform ex-ante illegal goods into ex-post illegal goods, i. e. , the melting ice effect is magnified. Next, proposition Ill established that under uncertainty, a risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and illegal trade, than in a certainty environment.
Propositions I & III indicate that total exports will decline when uncertainty is introduced. A decline in exports, implies a decline in imports and a shrinking of the country's trade triangle as compared to the certainty case presented by Pitt. Furthermore, the smuggler's transformation curve under uncertainty is inferior to the smuggler's transformation curve in a world of certainty. Therefore, the introduction of uncertainty causes a negative shift in the range of possible welfare levels presented by Pitt for his ambiguous welfare case, i. e. , the trade triangle shrinks under uncertainty as compared to a world of certainty. In other words, the introduction of 13 uncertainty has a negative welfare effect regardless of whether the welfare effect of smuggling under certainty was positive or negative. 9 Examining this last statement in the context of proposition II, if it is assumed that smugglers are risk averse, then the negative shift in the range of possible welfare levels is even greater than for the risk neutral case. 10 Sh eik (1989) contends that in the smuggling literature, the risk associated with smuggling is modelled incorrectly. He argues that an implicit assumption in the literature is that smugglers are risk preferring. The foregoing analysis provides an example that contradicts his conclusion. 
VI. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS I: CHANGES IN THE WORLD PRICE, THE MARGINAL COST OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, AND TAXES
In the next two sections it is assumed that the firm is risk neutral.
The risk neutrality assumption is necessary in order to generate determinate results from the comparative static analysis. In order to analyze the affect of a change in the tax or world price of exports, the FOG, eqs. 18 and 19 are rewritten under the assumption of risk neutrality in the following manner, They indicate that an increase in the tax rate will reduce the equilibrium (41) (42) level of demand for legal and illegal inputs. This result implies that the consequence of a rise in the tax rate is a decline in joint-product exports.
Which leads to a decline in imports and welfare.
If all of the differentials except dL, dS, and dP f are set to zero, then we have proposition V.
PROPOSITION V. An increase in che world price of exporcs, ceceris paribus, will increase che smuggling firm's demand for legal and illegal inpucs. The rise in demand will increase joinc-producc ex:porcs, which leads co an increase in che councry's imporcs and welfare.
To establish proposition V all of the differentials except dL, dS, and dP f are set to zero. It is now possible to derive the partial derivatives, ( 43) Equations 43 and 44 establishes proposition V for the risk neutral firm. They indicate that a rise in the world price for exports will increase the equilibrium level of demand for legal and illegal inputs. This result implies that the consequence of a rise in the world price for exports is an increase in joint-product exports, leading to a rise in imports and welfare.
If all of the differentials except dL, dS, and dP 8 are set to zero, then we have proposition VI. PROPOSITION VI. An increase in che marginal cost for che domestic produccion of ex:porcs, ceteris paribus, will decrease che smuggling firm's demand for legal and illegal inputs. The decline in demand will decrease joinc-producc exporcs, which in cum will induce a decline in che councry's imporcs and welfare.
To establish proposition VI all of the differentials except dL, dS, and dP 8 are set to zero. It is now possible to derive the partial derivatives, Eq uations 45 and 46 demonstrate that a rise in the marginal cost of domestic production of the good to be exported will decrease the equilibrium level of demand for legal and illegal inputs. This result implies that the consequence of a rise in the marginal cost of domestic production is a decline in jointproduct exports. Which leads to a decline in imports and welfare.
VII. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS II: CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT AND UNCERTAINTY
A change in the level of enforcement or uncertainty implies a change in the moments of the random variable u, the smuggling success rate. Assume that the effect of an increase in anti-smuggling enforcement efficiency, implies a decline in the expected value of the smuggling success rate. This assumption leads to proposition VII, PROPOSITION VII. An increase in enforcement: act:ivit:y against: smuggling, cet:eris paribus, will decrease t:he risk neut:ral firm's demand for legal and illegal inputs. The decline in demand will decrease the country's joint product exports, leading to a decline in imports and welfare.
To establish proposition VII a decline in the expected value of the smuggling success rate is analyzed by replacing u with u·-u+a in equations 39 and 40. Then, differentiating with respect to 8, and evaluating the resulting changes in the demand for legal and illegal inputs at 9=0, produces equations 47 and 48.
A decline in 8 has the effect of shifting the probability distribution of u to the left and decreasing the expected value of the smuggling success rate for each level of legal and illegal inputs, without altering the shape of the probability distribution. The result of this distribution preserving shift in the mean is only determinate for the risk neutral case and is presented below in eqs. 47 and 48.
as;ae
Proposition VII is established under the assumption that #>-1. This (47) (48) results in oL/o0 and as;ae both being positive. An implication of aL/o9 being positive, is that if enforcement activity against smuggling is increased, then export tax revenues will decline.
Next, the effect of a marginal increase in uncertainty is considered.
To capture the effect of a marginal change in uncertainty, the distribution of u will undergo a mean preserving change in the dispersion of the distribution. To establish proposition VIII, it assumed the firm is risk neutral.
Differentiating the transformed equations 39 and 40 with respect to a and evaluating oL/oa and oS/aa at a = l, yields
and (50) The signs of the partial derivatives derived above can be determined by examining the following relationships:
By ascertaining the signs of the above covariance terms, the signs of the numerators in eqs. 49 and SO can be determined.
Ex amining the derivatives of the three components of the covariance terms in eqs. 51 and 52 with respect to u yields, 
U n der the concavity assumption imposed on the smuggling production function and the marginal product functions discussed earlier, the signs of the covariance terms are negative. Negative covariance terms yield negative signs for the partial derivatives, oL/oa < 0 and as;aa < 0, and establishes proposition VIII.
The comparative static analysis of a change in enforcement or uncertainty in this section was performed using the modelling techniques developed in the "competitive firm under uncertainty" literature. An analysis of the effect of increased uncertainty on smuggling behavior or increased enforcement's effect on the average rate of successful smuggling reveals that in a joint product model, legal and illegal trade decline. Therefore, welfare will decline as enforcement efficiency or uncertainty increase. The stochastic model developed in this paper makes a contribution by providing insight into how enforcement and uncertainty effect the smuggling firm's input demand and joint-product (output supply) production decisions.
IX. A BRIBERY MODEL OF JOINT PRODUCT SMUGGLING
The real resource cost associated with smuggling was defined in equation 14 as being equal to s 1 -s * . Assume that bribes replace cloaking activities as the source of the "melting ice effect", the difference between S 1 -s * . 12
If bribery payments are consider to be just an income transfer, then the melting ice effect is rendered welfare neutral.
The substitution of bribery for cloaking activities in the certainty model presented earlier generates Pitt's strictly positive welfare effect for smuggling as compared to non-smuggling. However, the introduction of uncertainty in section IV, demonstrates that the mere presence of uncertainty will reduce the positive welfare effect of smuggling as compared to smuggling in a world of certainty. The implication of introducing uncertainty is that the smuggler's bribery cost increases as compared to smuggling in a world of certainty.
X. SUMMARY.
A stochastic model of joint-product smuggling was presented in this paper. The stochastic modeling approach used in this paper extends the microeconomic foundation of the smuggling literature by merging it with the literature on firm behavior under uncertainty.
The stochastic model developed in this paper extends the crime-theoretic Equation 32 is identical to Eq . 28. Therefore, the sign of Eq . 32 is the same as U· (�). The sign of Eq. 31 is positive. Thus, SIGN COV -SIGN U· (�) in Eq. 27.
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX

5.
The elasticity of the marginal product curve of legal trade is defined as 6. The assumptions imposed in eqs. 35 and 36 are consistent with the assumption that the marginal product functions are concave. By ascertaining the signs of the covariance terms in equations 51 and 52, the signs of the numerators in equations 49 and 50 can be de termined.
Examining the derivatives of the two comp onents of the covariance terms with respect to u, will allow us to determine the signs of the covariance terms in eqs.� and -::ea. 
